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THE "NO-MAN'S-LAND" AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD'S JURISDICTIONAL POLICIES
by
JOHN H. FANNING*
The "No-Man's Land" is real since the Supreme Court decided Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Board.' Guss was a small employer in Salt Lake
City who manufactured photographic equipment for the Air Force. He
purchased some of his materials outside the state, and he shipped some of
his products to places outside Utah. The Steelworkers of America had
been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining
representative. Thereafter a Regional Director refused to issue a com-
plaint on the Union's charge of an unfair labor practice. The Director
concluded that the activities of the Union were predominantly local in
character and did not meet the Board's revised jurisdictional standards.!
The Union filed the same charges with the Utah Board. Relief was
granted through a remedial order which was affirmed in the Utah
Supreme Court. It was that decision which was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court. Because the operations of an employer fall short
of the national Board's jurisdiction requirements, the state Board does not
thereby acquire jurisdiction. In companion cases" the Supreme Court
held that the prohibition of state authority applied to state courts as well
as state labor boards, and was applicable even though no attempt had been
made to invoke the processes of the national board
The Guss decision has its roots in the Court's Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
N. Y. S. L. R. B. decision!5 In that case the Supreme Court held that
* Mr. Fanning is a 1941 graduate of the Catholic University of America School of Law.
He is a Member of the National Labor Relations Board, the State of Rhode Island and
United States Supreme Court Bars. Mr. Fanning is happy to acknowledge the assistance of
William A. Lubbers, Esq., of his staff, in the preparation of this article. Mr. Lubbers is a
1950 graduate of the University of Wisconsin Law School and a Member of the Wisconsin
Bar.
, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
2The Respondent's purchases from outside the State of Utah were less than $50,000.
The Board's applicable jurisdictional standard required purchases of $500,000. Joneiboro
Grain Drying Cooperative, 110 NLRB 481 (1954).
8 Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 427
AFL v. Pairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon et al., 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
4 Thus answering the question left open in Building Trades Council v. Kinard Con-
struction Company. 346 U.S. 933 (1954).
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where the federal board has jurisdiction over an industry and has asserted
jurisdiction over the labor relations in the industry generally, there re-
mained no room for the operation of state authority. The Court referred
to the commendable effort of the national and state boards to avoid con-
flict in this overlapping area of their labor relations statutes, but found
that in their negotiations, the national board had made no concession or
delegation of power to the states to deal with the subject involved in the
case, i.e., whether foremen might constitute themselves a bargaining unit.
The Court made reference to the problem eventually resolved in Guss in
the following words:
"The election of the National Board to decline jurisdiction in certain types of
cases, for budgetary reasons presents a different problem which we do not
now decide."
Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion in which he interpreted the
majority opinion:
"... to mean that it is beyond the power of the National Board to agree with
State agencies enforcing laws like the Wagner Act to divide, with due regard
to local interests, the domain over which Congress had given the National
Board abstract discretion but which practically, cannot be covered by it alone.
If such cooperative agreements between State and National Boards are barred
because the power which Congress has granted to the National Board ousted
or superseded State authority, I am unable to see how State authority can
revive because Congress has seen fit to put the Board on short rations."
Though it can be argued that Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of
the majority opinion in the Bethlehem case is open to question because it
seemingly ignores the fact that the Court there found that the national
Board had made "no concession or delegation of power to the States" to
deal with the subject involved in the litigation, Congress apparently
agreed with him, and as noted by the Court in the Guss decision, enacted
the proviso to Section 10 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
of 1947, in direct response to the problem he outlined. Section 10 (a)
"empowers the Board to prevent ... unfair labor practices ... affecting
commerce" which power shall be unaffected "by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, law or otherwise:
"Provided, that the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any
State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases . . . even
though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the
provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination
of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision
of this Act, or has received a construction inconsistent therewith."
Read in the light of such a background, the Court held that
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... the proviso to Section 10(a) is the exclusive means whereby States may
be enabled to act concerning the matters which Congress has entrusted to the
National Labor Relations Board."
It found support for its holding in a prior decision' where it had pointed
to the proviso as demonstrating a Congressional intention that the
national Act should preempt the field, and described it as authorizing
cession agreements only where state law is consistent with the national
legislation, thus insuring that the "national Labor policy will not be
thwarted even in the predominantly local enterprises to which the proviso
applies."'
The Court recognized that a denial of state jurisdiction in cases
arising under the Act, but as to which the NLRB declined to exercise its
statutory jurisdiction, would give rise to a "no-man's-land area subject to
regulation by no agency or court." However, since the only alternative, a
holding that states could act in this area, would produce confusion and
conflict with federal policy, and since Congress had expressed its judg-
ment in favor of uniformity the Court had no real choice, if it desired to
conform to its past decision in which it had discussed at some length the
destructive nature of the conflicts which arise when both state and federal
governments lay hold of the same relationship. In the La Crosse Tele-
phone Corp. case,' a unanimous Court said:
"In practical effect the true measure of conflict between the state and federal
scheme of regulation may not be found only in the collision between the
formal orders that the two boards may issue. We know that administrative
practice also disposes of cases in which no order has been entered. Disposition
of controversies on an administrative as distinguished from a formal basis
will often reflect the attitudes of the National Board which have not been
reduced to orders in those specific cases. A certification by a state board
under a different or conflicting theory of representation may therefore be as
readily disruptive of the practice under the federal act as if the orders of the
two boards made a head-on collision. These are the very real potentials of
conflict which lead us to allow supremacy to the federal scheme even though
it has not been applied in any formal way to this particular employer. The
problem of employee representation is a sensitive and delicate one in industrial
relations. The uncertainty as to which Board is master and how long it will
6 Amalgamated Association of Employees v. W.E.R.B., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
7 Id. 23. See also Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 301,
313 (1949); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
s La Crosse Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 18, 26 (1949). See also the Bethlehem case supra, where the Court said "If the two
Boards attempt to exercise a concurrent jurisdiction to decide the appropriate unit of repre-
sentation, action by one necessarily denies the discretion of the other. The second to act
either must follow the first, which would make its action useless and vain, or depart from
it, which would produce a mischievous conflict." And see Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346
U.S. 485 (1953), where the Court stated "Congress evidently considered that centralized
administration of specially designed procedures were necessary to obtain uniform application
of its substantive rules and to avoid those diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies."
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remain such can be as disruptive of peace between various industrial factions
as actual competition between two boards for supremacy."
By denying state authority to act in matters covered by the Act, the
Court has precluded such mischievous conflicts as would arise from the
exercise of both federal and state authority, as well as those conflicts and
diversities likely to result from the application of a variety of local pro-
cedures and attitudes toward labor controversies within the province of
the national Act. However, its decision does not automatically ensure that
the national labor policy embodied in the Act will be uniformly applied
to all enterprises which fall within the broad reaches of the Act.
This circumstance arises from two factors: first, the broad reach of
the Board's jurisdiction, and second, the fact that throughout its existence
the NLRB has declined to exercise its full statutory jurisdiction. The
legislative history of the Wagner Act makes it plain that in giving the
Board authority over labor disputes "affecting commerce" Congress under-
took to regulate all conduct that constitutionally it could regulate. Senate
Report No. 573,9 commenting on the committee decision to eliminate a
provision which would have excluded from the definition of employers
those enterprises employing 10 or fewer employees, stated:
"After deliberation, the Committee decided not to exclude employees
working for very small employers units. The rights of employees should not
be denied because of the size of the plant in which they work. Section 7 (c)
imposes no such limitation. And in cases where the organization of workers
is along craft or industrial lines, very large associations of workers fraught
with great public significance may exist, although all members work in very
small establishments. Furthermore, it is clear that the limitation of this bill
to events affecting interstate commerce is sufficient to prevent intervention by
the Federal government in controversies of purely local significance."
And later the same report states: 10
"While this bill of course does not intend to go beyond the commerce power
of Congress, as that power may be marked out by the Courts, it seeks the full
limit of that power."
As marked out by the courts the grant of authority of the Board is
indeed extensive. It extends to "activities which in isolation might be
deemed to be merely local but in the interlacings of business across state
lines adversely affect such commerce. 1 Coverage under "the Act does not
depend on any particular volume of commerce affected more than that
9 Senate Report No. 573, on S. 1958, p. 7.
10 Ibid, pp. 17-18.
11 Polish National Alliance of the United States of North America v. N.L.R.B. 322
U.S. 643, 647 (1944).
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to which courts would apply the maxim de minimis.2 And de minimis in
the law has always been taken to mean trifles-matters of a few dollars
or less.1" "If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not
matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze." 1' Indeed, the
Board has been almost completely successful in defeating challenges to
its jurisdiction. In the picturesque words of the third circuit opinion in
the Suburban Lumber case:
"Our courts have been addressed by the constant contention that the National
Labor Relations Board lacks jurisdiction. This is the more remarkable in
view of its complete lack of success. Locusts destroy but appeals against
regulation by the National Labor Relations Board of business on the ground
that it is intrastate are harmless insects indeed."
At the time of the enactment of the 1947 amendments to the Act it was
a settled principle that the Board's jurisdiction did indeed encompass all
that constitutionally Congress could grant. The legislative history of those
amendments reveals that Congress desired no limitation on the scope of
the Board's jurisdiction. Indeed the concern in this area was quite the
other way, and Congress actually broadened the scope of the Board's
authority to cover union unfair labor practices, some of which were aimed
specifically at protecting small employers from union excesses.
This extensive grant of authority has not been an unmixed blessing
for the Board. Though the Board was quick to maintain its authority
when challenged, it soon became apparent that assertion of its entire
jurisdiction was not feasible, if the Board was to be able to process expe-
ditiously the large number of cases which are filed. Accordingly, the
Board has declined to assert jurisdiction over some enterprises because
their operations were "essentially local in character," or had "too remote
or insubstantial effect on commerce" or "because their operations were
inherently local in nature." For the first 15 years of its existence the
Board made such jurisdictional determinations on a case to case basis. Out
of such decisions there naturally emerged a rough pattern delineating the
areas in which the Board would assert and those areas in which it would
not assert jurisdiction. In 1950 the Board departed from its practice of
determining jurisdiction on a case to case basis, and enunciated a series of
jurisdictional standards. It chose the Hollow Tree Lumber case to justify
its action, stating: Is
12 N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
IsN.L.R.B. v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F. 2d 829 (C.A. 3d. 1941).
14 United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturer's Association, 336 U.S. 460
(1949).
15 Hollow Tree Lumber Company, 91 NLRB 635 (1950).
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"The Board has long been of the opinion that it would better effectuate the
purpose of the Act, and promote the prompt handling of major cases, not to
exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible under the authority dele-
gated to it by Congress, but to limit that exercise to enterprises whose opera-
tions have, or at which labor disputes would have, a pronounced impact upon
the flow of interstate commerce. This policy should, in our opinion, be main-
tained. The time has come, we believe, when experience warrants the estab-
lishment of certain standards which will better clarify and define where the
difficult line can best be drawn."
The standards chosen "reflected in large measure, the results reached in
the Board's past decisions disposing of similar jurisdictional issues,""8 and
were chosen not alone to promote the prompt handling of cases, but also
in "the interest of certainty,"17 as to where the jurisdictional dividing line
would lie. In an accompanying statement released to the press coinci-
dentally with the issuance of the decisions setting forth the standards, the
Board termed its action a reiteration of "its policy of not exercising juris-
diction, despite its power to do so, over business operations so local in
character that a labor dispute would be unlikely to have a sufficient
impact upon interstate commerce to justify an already burdened Federal
Board in expending time, energy and public funds.""
These standards remained in effect until July 1, 1954, when a divided
Board established new jurisdictional standards, which were generally
more restrictive in nature, and which added significantly to the number
of enterprises falling in the "twilight zone between unexercised federal
jurisdiction, and unquestioned state jurisdiction." In its opinion in the
Breeding Transfer case'" justifying the 1954 standards, the Board major-
ity stated:
"In making these modifications, we have given due consideration to all of the
criteria spelled out by the Board in 1950, including (1) the problem of
bringing the case load down to manageable size, (2) the desirability of
reducing an extraordinarily large case load in order that we may give ade-
quate attention to more important cases, (3) the relative importance to the
National economy of essentially local enterprises as'against those having a
truly substantial impact on our economy, and (4) overall budgetary policies
and limitations. If one of the inevitable consequences of our action is to leave
a somewhat larger area for local regulation of disputes, we do not share our
colleagues' apparent view that this is a sinister development. We do say,
however, that a desire to establish broader State jurisdiction is in no wise a
factor in our decision. We are concerned here solely with the problem of
defining the limits of our jurisdiction pursuant to the discretionary power
vested in us by Congress."
The majority's action was met by two dissents; but it is interesting to note
'a Ibid.
17 Dorn's House of Miracles, Inc., 91 NLRB 632 (1950).
58 Press Release, R-342, October 6, 1950.
19 110 NLRB 493 (1954).
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that though there was disagreement as to the propriety of further restrict-
ing the Board's jurisdiction, there was no disagreement as to the existence
of the Board's discretionary power, to decline to exercise its full jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, both the dissenting and majority members were in basic
agreement that a discretionary declination of jurisdiction must be based
primarily on budgetary considerations. A major point of disagreement
was over whether or not the considerations cited by the majority justified
the action taken, i.e., whether in terms of the existent budgetary situation,
the size of the Board's case load and backlog required such action.
The Board's claim of a discretionary power to decline to assert juris-
diction when it determines that such action would best effectuate the
policies of the Act has generally met with approval in the Courts. The
ninth circuit's decision in Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB2" fairly reflects
the general view. The general counsel had issued a complaint in Hales-
ton, although the company's operations failed to satisfy the Board's re-
cently adopted 1950 jurisdictional standards, pursuant to his view that
the Act required the Board to assert its full jurisdiction. The Board dis-
missed the complaint. The company argued before the court, that as
Section 3(d) which was added to the Act in 1947, gave the general
counsel sole authority to decide whether or not to issue complaints, the
Board was without authority to dismiss the complaint on jurisdictional
grounds. The court rejected the argument, finding that Section 3(d) in
no way abridged the Board's "discretionary authority to decline to assert
jurisdiction" and noted that prior to the 1947 amendments:
"The Board itself, without judicial challenge acted on the assumption that it
could, for reasons of policy, or for budgetary or other reasons decline to
issue an unfair labor practice complaint, or to dismiss a complaint after
issuance, without determining the existence of an unfair labor practice, if
in its reasoned judgment the policies of the Act would best be served by that
course. Of this assumption and practice one cannot doubt that Congress was
fully cognizant."
Accordingly, the question was, not whether there is power to withhold
jurisdiction, but whether such power rather than residing solely in the
general counsel was not also possessed by the Board, and the court's
answer was in the affirmative. In numerous other cases the courts were
asked to pass upon the propriety of the Board's jurisdictional determina-
tions under the 1950 jurisdictional plan, and the general view was that
in the absence of arbitrary or capricious action, the question of whether
the Board should exercise jurisdiction is for the Board to determine and
20 187 F. 2d 418 (C.A. 9th, 1951).
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not the courts. The existence of some degree of discretion was also noted
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun-
cil: 21
"Even when the effect of activities on interstate commerce is sufficient to take
jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes properly declines to do so,
stating that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by its assertion
of jurisdiction in that case."
Thus as a practical matter the Board had been successful both in
marking out the widest possible area in which to act, should it so choose,
and in maintaining its discretionary power to decide for itself whether it
should act.22 During this period the states indicated willingness to step
in when the Board declined to act,2" with the result that there was not,
before Guss, an actual .'no-man's-land, subject to regulation by no agency
or court," but rather a "twilight zone between exercised federal jurisdic-
tion and unquestioned state jurisdiction." Manifestly, in transmuting this
"twilight zone" into a "no-man's land" the Guss decision fell short of
ensuring that the labor policy decreed by Congress would be applied
uniformly to all labor disputes within the Board's province.
The Court showed its concern for this aspect of the problem by
directing the attention of Congress and the Board to the problem and
inviting those agencies, and the states as well, to take action to eliminate
or reduce the extent of the no-man's-land area. This problem is a serious
one, for to the extent that federal power has displaced state power in the
"sensitive and delicate" area of labor relations, only to remain unexer-
cised, the federal government is in danger of appearing to adopt a "dog
in the manger" attitude towards the states. This is a circumstance which
must ultimately be reflected in a diminution of respect for the federal
government, and a consequent weakening of our federal-state system.'
21341 U.S. 675 (1951).
22 In a case decided after Guss, the Court although reserving opinion on the validity of
any set of jurisdictional standards, and although finding that the Board had exceeded its
authority in declining to assert jurisdiction over labor unions when acting as employers, as a
class, seemed to affirm the existence of the Board's discretionary authority to decline to
assert its full statutory jurisdiction. See Office Employees' International Union Local No. 11
v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
23 See for example Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Reaping Leather Com-
pany, 228 Wis. 473, 279 N.W. 673 (1938).
24 Compare the concern displayed in Justice Burton's dissenting opinion in Guss with
the effect of that decision on our federal-state system: "Congress has demonstrated a con-
tinuing and deep interest in providing governmental machinery for handling labor contro-
versies. The creation by [the Court] of a large unsupervised no-man's land flies in the face
of that policy. Due regard for our federal system suggests that all doubts on this score
should be resolved in favor of a conclusion that would not leave the States powerless when
the federal agency declines to exercise its jurisdiction."
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It may be taken for granted that the Supreme Court will examine care-
fully the response of these agencies to its invitation, if called again to pass
upon cases arising in the no-man's land area.25
Both Congress and the NLRB have responded to the Court's invita-
tion, and have done so by taking action designed to reduce significantly the
extent of the no-man's-land area. Though a proposed amendment to the
Act, which would have made it mandatory upon the Board to exercise its
full statutory jurisdiction, or else arrange for cession to the states, where
possible, failed of passage in the 85th Congress with the defeat of the
Kennedy-Ives bill, (S. 3974), Congress did appropriate an extra $1,500,-
000 for the express purpose of enabling the Board to extend its jurisdic-
tion. The Board for its part has proceeded to reexamine its jurisdictional
policies and has revised its jurisdictional standards. In its lead decision
announcing this change of policy, the Board stated that its action would
enable more individuals, labor organizations and employers to invoke
the rights and protections afforded by the Act.2 The Board conceded that
its new standards would not entirely eliminate the no-man's-land area.
The Siemons Mailing Service decision makes it clear, however, that this
was because
"the expected caseload resulting from (the revised standards] represents the
maximum workload that can be expeditiously and effectively handled by the
Board and its staff within existing budgetary limitations. To broaden its
exercised jurisdiction -till further at this time would ...produce a caseload
of such proportions seriously to lengthen the time for processing cases,
thus lessening the efi y of the Board as a form to which labor disputants
may turn for aid in i Iying their disputes."
While one may disagree with the Board's estimate as to its case handling
capabilities, surely the Board is in the best position to judge this factor,
and one must grant that the Board in moving into the no-man's-land has
acknowledged its responsibility "to extend the national labor policies
embodied in the Act as close to the legal limits of its jurisdiction estab-
lished by Congress as its resources permit."2
25 The Supreme Court heard argument in one such case on November 10, 1958. Hotel
Employees Local No. 255, et al. v. Boyd Leedom, et al. October Term 1958, No. 21.
26 Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB No. 13 (1958).
2TSiemons Mailing Service, supra, ($50,000 inflow-outflow standard for non-retail
enterprises). See also Raritan Valley Broadcasting Company, 122 NLRB No. 16, ($100,000
annual gross volume of business standard for communications systems other than news-
papers); Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., 122 NLRB No. 17, ($500,000 annual gross
volume of business standard for retail enterprises); Sioux Valley Empire Electric Associa-
tion, 122 NLRB No. 18, ($250,000 annual gross volume of business standard for local
public utilities, or alternatively application of $50,000 inflow-outflow test for non-retail
enterprises generally); Ready Mixed Concrete & Materials, Inc., 122 NLRB No. 43, (sub-
stantial impact on national defense); H P 0 Service. Inc., 122 NLRB No. 62, (standard
1959]
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Furthermore, the Board has made an obvious effort to meet the objection
to its 1954 jurisdictional standards explicitly noted by the Court, that the
reasons for those standards did not appear to be basically budgetary in
nature, but had more to do with the Board's concept of the class of cases
to which it should devote its attention.8
The Board has thus taken a significant step in the direction of a
truly uniform application of the federal labor policies embodied in the
Act. Though it contends that it cannot go the whole way at this time, it
has indicated its intention to continually review and police its policies and
procedures, to the end of a further extension of its jurisdiction.
The problem involved herein, is not alone that of the federal gov-
ernment. It is one in which the states are also intimately involved. Labor
disputes in the no-man's-land may have only a small impact on interstate
commerce, but their impact can be greatly disruptive of local commerce,
and it is as much a matter of state concern as of federal concern that they
not go unregulated. Congress enacted the proviso to Section 10 (a) to
enable the NLRB to cede jurisdiction in certain areas to those state agen-
cies applying regulatory provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of
the Act, with the evident intention that the states should adopt labor laws
modelled on the Act. The states have chosen not to pass such labor laws.
So long as it appeared that the states might succeed to authority to regu-
late the labor relations of enterprises over which the Board declined juris-
diction, one could not quarrel with their desire to apply their own laws
in such circumstances. Now that this possibility has been foreclosed, a
reexamination of policy by the states, as well as by the federal govern-
ment is called for. The states could, without retreating from their desire
to regulate labor relations which are outside the Board's jurisdiction as
they see fit, make it possible for the Board to cede jurisdiction to them over
the no-man's-land, by enacting provisions authorizing a state agency to
apply the provisions of the federal Act in such cases, thus enabling the
NLRB to enter into cession agreements with them.
As the situation now stands, the NLRB takes the position that it is
unable to enter into cession agreements with any state, because of the lack
of consistency between State Acts and the Federal Act."9 In the Fairlawn
for transportation enterprises and their essential links-S50,000 revenues from interstate
(or linkage) portion of operations, or from services performed for employers in commerce);
Belleview Employing Printers, 122 NLRB No. 58, ($200,000 gross annual volume of
business standard for newspaper companies.)
28 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, supra, at page 19.
29 See Thirteenth Annual Report of the NLRB, p. 18. See also footnote 17 of the
Supreme Court's decision in the Guss case.
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case the Court stated:"
"Congress did not leave it to state labor agencies, to state Courts, or to this
Court to decide how consistent with federal policy state law must be. The
power to make that decision in the first instance was given to the National
Labor Relations Board, guided by the language of Section 10 (a)."
It has been suggested that the Board takes too narrow a view of its
authority under Section 10 (a) by requiring in effect that state laws con-
tain provisions parallel to the national Act, 1 and that all that is required
is that a state be delegated authority to process cases which would be
decided under particular provisions which are consistent with similar pro-
visions of the Act. Though this approach of partial cession of jurisdiction
under 10 (a) may be worthy of exploration, it is doubtful that it will
greatly aid in eliminating the no-man's land. In the first place, the cession
proviso was enacted to ensure that the federal policy would not be
thwarted even in the predominantly local enterprises to which the proviso
applies, and it constituted, at least in part, as already noted an invitation
to the states to adopt labor legislation modelled upon the federal law.
Not a single state has accepted the invitation. And it must be remembered
that authority for a state agency to act, whether pursuant to a cession
agreement or otherwise comes from the state legislature. A cession agree-
ment cannot add to its powers, nor, it would appear to be axiomatic, de-
tract from its responsibilities. Could a state agency lawfully expend appro-
priations granted by its state legislature in order to enforce only part of
the provisions of the Act which constitute the policy of the state? Sec-
ondly, the purpose to be achieved by the Board in ceding jurisdiction over
the no-man's-land would be to bring under the Act the labor relations of
those enterprises as to which it is not now able to assert its authority be-
cause of "budgetary limitations." Were it to enforce some of the pro-
visions of the ndtional policy by virtue of a partial cession agreement,
would it not have to accept jurisdiction over the enterprises affected by
such cession, in order to enforce those provisions as to which cession is
not possible due to the insufficiency of the State statute? Moreover, could
the Board cede jurisdiction with respect to local enterprises in one state,
without itself asserting jurisdiction over similar enterprises in states hav-
ing no agency to which cession can be made? Would this be consistent
with both the Congressional intention to apply a uniform national labor
policy across the broad reaches of the Act, an intention so overriding that
ao Supra.
31 The Misinterpretation of Section 70 (a), Alfred W. Blumrosen, Labor Law Journal,
April 1958.
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the Supreme Court felt compelled to deny state authority even where the
NLRB has declined to act? Would it be consistent with the constitutional
requirement of uniform application of legislation of a general nature?
If the answer to any of these questions is in the negative, partial cession
agreements actually would result in increasing the Board's case load, and
thus fail to achieve their purpose. If, on the other hand, these prove to be
but insubstantial objection, there is the likelihood that under "partial
cession agreements" the Board would have to devote so much time in
determining in which cases cession would be possible, and in advising
state agencies as to Board policy, 2 and in generally policing the agree-
ments, as to make such agreement simply not a feasible means of ensuring
that the national labor policies of the Act are brought to bear upon the
no-man's-land. However that may be, it appears doubtful, to say the least
that the answer to the no-man's-land will be found through partial cession
agreements.
The answer appears to lie instead along the avenue chosen by the
Board, which seems to lead to a virtually complete assertion of the federal
authority over the no-man's-land. This may require additional funds from
Congress, which has already indicated its great concern that its policies be
applied to the full extent intended in the enacting legislation. In the
meantime, we can be sure that the Court will have the opportunity to
pass upon the reasonableness of the Board's response to the problem in
adopting its new jurisdictional standards."3 While we cannot be sure of
the Court's future decision in this regard, so long as the Board adheres to
the spirit of its Siemons Mailing Service decision, we can expect a sympa-
thetic understanding of the Board's efforts responsibly to deal with the
problem of the no-man's-land. For the Board has indicated an awareness
that the continued existence of any appreciable no-man's-land cannot long
be tolerated.
2 As the Supreme Court noted in the La Crosse Telephone case, supra, "Disposition of
the controversies on an administrative as distinguished from a formal basis will often reflect
the attitudes of the National Board which have not been reduced to orders in those specific
cases.
33 See footnote 27 supra.
